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Summary findings
Public enterprises in the formerly socialist countries have  They argue that the options differ depending on the
provided many social services to employees and the  benefits. Some benefits should remain as part of a
public, services that divert theni from their core  traditional  labor compensation package, and others
activities, raise their costs, and keep them from being  should be privatized or transferred to municipal
competitive. How to deal with these social assets is a  governments. Housing, especially, and child care
major problem in enterprise  restructuring: Large  facilities are services enterprises should not be in the
insolvent enterprises that provide many social services in  business of providing, they contend.  Divesting
a community often have the bargaining power to delay  enterprises of housing is a transitional strategy on the
bankruptcy procedures and force the state to continue  way to transferring its ownership and  management to the
subsidizing them. But users of social services are not  private sector.
protected  from enterprise  managers' arbitrary actions or  Unfortunately, the rules of the game under which
from a general deterioration  in the level of services  municipal governments divest enterprises of housing are
provided.  nontransparent  and entirely under municipal control,
As enterprises are restructured,  the public sector must  and vested interests have many ways to postpone  or
become involved in (1) protecting critical services, such  block divestiture - even though most enterprise
as kindergarten, that might otherwise disappear as  managers welcome it because it will reduce their costs
enterprise funding is reduced, (2) facilitating reform  and administrative burden.
of housing and health services, among others,  Social spending by Russian enterprises represents as
(3) guaranteeing citizens' access to public services, and  much as 20 percent of gross wage costs. Shifting and
(4) reducing costs by rationalizing the management and  reducing those costs requires smart financial and tax
provision of services. Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya  planning, sound regulations, and housing reform
analyze policy options in the restructuring of enterprises'  (including greater cos- recovery), among other things.
social assets.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem  of enterprise social  assets is one of the most important  issues facing enterprise
restructuring.  The extensive provisioning  of social services to both employees and  general public in
surrounding  communities  diverts  enterprises  from their  core  activities.  Financial  and administrative
burdens associated with social services raise costs and prevent enterprises from being competitive. Social
assets are considered as an additional barrier for external investors who might refrain from investments
in  enterprises  with  large  social  liabilities.  Additionally,  in  cases  where  large  potentially  insolvent
enterprises provide a number of social services to their communities,  it increases the bargaining power
of  such uncompetitive  enterprises  vis-a-vis  governmental  authorities.  It  makes very  it difficult for
bankruptcy procedures to be initiated against them, and forces the state to continue to subsidize them.
Users  of enterprise social services are often not protected  enough from arbitrary  actions of enterprise
managers and a general deterioration in the level of provided services.
The downsizing of enterprises'  social activities means that some other agents will have to perform
these functions  in their place.  That is why the issue  of enterprise social assets  is not only one of the
crucial components of industrial restructuring,  but is also closely connected with both public and social
sector  reforms.  There  are a  number  of purposes  for  the  public  sector's  involvement  in substituting
enterprise social functions: (i) protection of some critical elements of public services (e.g. kindergartens),
which might otherwise disappear due to reductions in enterprises'  funding; (ii) facilitating of reforms in
both housing and delivering mechanisms for some public services (e.g. health services), which would be
easier  if  all corresponding  assets were  temporarily concentrated under  the management of  municipal
governments; (iii) guaranteeing adequate access for citizens to important public services, largely because
social activities of enterprises are sometimes delivered at a much higher,  sometimes at a much lower,
level than public ones;  (iv) financial savings through  rationalization of management and provision  of
services.  At the same time, some former  enterprise social assets could be either  privatized or used to
introduce new institutional reforms in the public sector.  These assets are not necessarily to be transferred
to existing public governance structures and fall under the control of prevailing interests therein.  So, the
divestiture of these assets could make them pioneers in social sector restructuring and, therefore, might
facilitate social sector reforms in general.
The paper reflects some findings derived from the preparation work done under the World Bank's
Enterprise  Housing  Divestiture  Project. The Project was managed  by Dennis  Whittle  and Mari Kuraishi,  whom  we
are very grateful  for stimulating  discussions  and organizational  support.  We thank also Marina  Krasilnikova,  Olga
Shabalina,  Jeff Procak, Alexander  Morozov, and Natasha  Veligura  for helpful  comments  and help with collecting
and processing  the data.  Any errors are our own.- 2 -
At the same time,  it's quite clear that the ultimate objective  in cases where enterprises  provide
households  with heavily  subsidized  private  goods  is comprehensive  privatization  of corresponding  services
and subsidy elimination.  However, due  to  existing political and  social constraints, immediate
implementation  of such policies is considered as unacceptable  by most governments in transitional
economies. The whole problem of divestiture  is derived from the necessity  to design a procedure that
would  substitute  enterprises  by municipalities  in a way which  preserves  continuation  of basic services  and
takes into account major fiscal and institutional consequences  of such a substitution.  Therefore an
appropriate  divestiture  policy must be seen as a transitional  strategy that is accompanied  by measures  to
push the ownership,  financing, and management  into the private sector.
While the importance  of this problem for the Russian economy has been widely recognized
(World Bank, 1994), very little empirical analysis  has been done, and only recently has the situation
begun to change.  Among the recently prepared most detailed studies are the paper written by Simon
Commander  and Une Lee (Commander  and Lee, 1995)  devoted  to the scope of social benefits  which are
typically provided  by Russian firms, as well as the Report on Russian  Enterprise Housing Divestiture
prepared by the group of experts from the Urban Institute (Urban Institute, 1995). Both of these  papers
are based on enterprise  surveys and interviews. A number studies of the problem  with enterprise social
assets transferral  have been started recently with respect to other FSU countries  (ADB, 1995; Cheasty,
1996; O'Keefe. 1995).
This paper is based on some additional  sources of information,  which include  various macro and
sectoral data provided by the Goskomstat  and the Ministry of Economy  of Russian Federation. It also
includes data collected in the course of preparation  of the World Bank Enterprise Housing  Divestiture
Project. 2 This survey of 24 enterprises  was conducted  in 10 cities at the end of 1994 and beginning  of
1995.  Respective  municipalities  were also surveyed.  Though the study was primarily directed at
enterprise housing issues, the problems of other social assets and benefits were also taken into account.
Additional information on legal and financial framework of enterprise social assets functioning and
divestiture was collected from eleven cities who competed for participation in the project through a
number of interviews  with city officials and enterprise  managers.
This paper has the following structure. The first section describes the major trends in overall
enterprise social spending  over 1992-94. Section  two discusses  major factors influencing  restructuring
of enterprise social assets, among which macroeconomic,  legal, and financial parameters. The third
section provides brief summary of major potential directions of such restructuring, including newly-
reconstituted  forms of enterprise control over social assets, divestiture  and privatization. Sections  four
and five discuss potential consequences, including financial impact, of social asset divestiture on
correspondingly  enterprises  and municipalities. Section six is focused  on barriers for divestiture,  while
the remaining section provides some recommendations  to facilitate the divestiture process.  A more
detailed  description  of the enterprise sample is presented in the Annex 1. The second annex lists major
government regulatory acts, which govern the divestiture process in Russia.  Annex 3 describes the
peculiarities  of providing social services by enterprises in two specific sectors, agriculture and coal.
Annex 4 presents a case study of Vladimir Tractor Plant, which demonstrates  the scale of potential
benefits from divestiture  for a typical  Russian manufacturer.
2  This  information  was  partially  used  in the  paper  of S. Commander  and U. Lee  mentioned  above.- 3-
1. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
This section provides  some macro estimates concerning the overall scale of Russian enterprise
involvement in delivering social services. It could be argued that while being quite substantial, enterprise
social spending is still much lower than some earlier estimates that were derived from small enterprise
surveys.  In particular,  such spending did not surpass a level of 15% of GDP (Alm and Sjoquist,  1993)
not did it amount to 40% of the wage bill (Commander and Jackman,  1993).
Table  I provides some estimates of the value of social assets at the disposal of Russian enterprises
before the intensification  of the divestiture process  in  1994.  By the end of  1993, total social assets
amounted to 5% percent of the total fixed capital assets accumulated by the enterprise sector.  Assets in
housing and utilities made two thirds of this total, and assets in education and health exceeded 20% of
total social assets.  (This data is derived from Goskomstat's  regular annual statistics (form No. 1  I).)  Due
to high inflation in Russia and the unsatisfactory way in which the accumulated stock of fixed capital has
been revalued, the quality of the provided data is not very high.  In particular, it is not comparable across
stock (accumulated social  assets) and  flow (new construction  of social  assets in  1992-93) variables.
Despite these deficiencies,  this information  is useful  in considering the structure of the social assets'
accumulated stock. Table  1 also suggests that divestiture was very slow in both  1992 and  1993.
As reported by  Goskomstat, 3 total social spending by the enterprise sector amounted to about
3.1%  of GDP in 1993 and 3.5%  in 1994. Social spending in 1993-94 decreased by 30% (in real terms)
compared to its 1992 level.  Enterprises did not make any additional reductions  in real social spending
in  1994,  despite the  partial  divestiture  of  social  assets  occurring  during  this  year  and  the  general
deterioration  of  the  overall  financial  position  of  the  enterprise  sector.  This  can  be  explained  by
continuation of cash wage restrictions in the form of the excess wage tax, which, together with relatively
high rates of payroll taxes in Russia, encouraged enterprises to makes shifts within their benefit packages
towards more non-cash benefits, including social services.  As a result,  1994 social spending constituted
a much larger share of gross profit in the economy than in 1993.  About 30% of the overall 1994 social
expenditures was spent on housing  maintenance,  22% on  education and health  services,  and about  a
quarter on new investments in social assets (Table 2).  More than 60% of the total amount  in 1993-94
was spent by industrial enterprises employing less than 30% of the total Russian labor force (Table 3).
Enterprise  social  spending as a whole  was the  equivalent to a  little more  than  25% of total
consolidated budget spending on social purposes and housing in 19934. This share dropped to 22% in
1994 due to a relative decline in enterprise spending on both housing and health.  Enterprise contributions
to financing housing maintenance were equivalent to almost 30% of the actual budgetary spending on this
purpose in 1993. They declined to 23% in 1994.
3  The numbers  are derived  from Goskomstat's  official  publication  (form No. 10f)  of financial  indicators  for
various sectors in the Russian  economy. The quality  of these data is discussed  below.
4  This does  exclude  transfers  from extra-budgetary  funds, i.e. government  expenditures  on social  protection.- 4  -
Table 1. Social  spending  by the enterprise  sector  in Russia, in 1992-94  in real and nominal  terms.
1992  1993  1994
Social  spending,  total, trln rb, current prices  0.739  5.36  21.12
- health  n.a.  0.99  2.79
- education  and culture  n.a.  0.58  1.78
- housing, only  maintenence  n.a.  1.96  6.48
- investments  n.a.  n.a.  5.42
- other  n.a.  1.83  4.65
Social  spending,  total, as % of GDP  3.89  3.13  3.46
Social  spending,  total, real, 1992= 100  100  72.89  71.27
MEMO:
GDP, trln. rbl  19  171.5  611
ICPI  14.54  9.95  4.03
Source:  Goskomstat, own estimates- 5  -
Table  2.  Social spending by the enterprise  sector in Russia, in 1993-94,  trln. rbl.
1993  1994
Total  Industry  Agriculture  Total  Industry  Agriculture
I.Social  spending, total  5.36  3.47  0.43  21.12  12.99  1.564
- health  0.99  0.64  0.086  2.79  1.93  0.126
- education and culture  0.58  0.41  0.047  1.78  1.29  0.159
- housing, only maintenance  1.96  1.15  0.169  6.48  3.97  0.486
- investments  n.a..  n.a.  n.a.  5.42  2.83  0.506
- other  1.83  1.27  0.128  4.65  2.97  0.287
NEEMO:
2. Revenue from sales  184.2  107.6  9.52  607.77  357.68  25.61
3. Total costs, 3/  152.6  85.9  7.65  545.28  304.8  28.02
4.  Profit from sales  31.2  21.8  2.06  62.49  47.37  -2.5
5. Total gross profit, net losses  37.5  26.73  2.8  80.44  52.71  -0.32
6. Total wage bill, with bonuses, l/  32.22  15.72  3.41  105.36  49.41  8.87
7.  Pavroll tax,  2/  9.21  3.91  0.85  33.5  16  2.3
S. Budget expenditure on health  5.43  27.45
9.  Budget expenditure on education and cu  7.96  24.34
10. Budget expenditure on housing  6.6  28.67
Social spending  as:
a part  of distributed  profit (line.5),  %  14.29  12.98  15.36  26.26  24.64  488.75
a part of zotal  labor  costs (lines  6+8), %  12.94  17.68  10.09  15.21  19.86  14.00
a part of wage  bill (line 6), %  16.64  22.07  12.61  20.05  26.29  17.63
Total  labor costs  with social  expend.
ds  a part total  costs (line 3), %  30.66  26.89  61.34  29.34  25.72  45.45
Social  spending  as a part of
the  total  social  budget spending,  .
- health (line 8)  18.23  10.16
- education and culture (line 9)  7.29  7.31
- housing (line 10)  29.70  22.60
Source: Goskomstat, own estimates
Notes:  I/ as reported in Goskomstat in the form lOf
2'! esnimate
3"'  including VAT and Excises paid on inputsTable  3. The structure of fixed capital assets at the disposal of Russian enterprises. 1/
In bin rbl  as % of total
1991  1992  1993  1991  1992  1993
1.Stock of fixed capital assets, 2/  7780  28539  37409  100  100  100
o/W:
- main (industrial) activities  7521  25418  33830  96.67  89.06  90.43
- non-productive activities  157  1051  1875  2.02  3.68  5.01
o/w:  housing  56  333  1038  0.72  1.17  2.77
utilities  n.a.  n.a.  250  n.a.  n.a.  0.67
health  n.a.  n.a.  273  n.a.  n.a.  0.73
education  n.a.  n.a.  141  n.a.  n.a.  0.38
other  n.a.  n.a.  173  n.a.  n.a.  0.46
2. Flow of new assets:  new construction  375  8541  100  100
o/w:
- main (industrial) activities  343  7131  91.47  83.49
- non-productive activities  26  950  6.93  11.12
ojw:  housing  16  707  4.27  8.28
3. Divestiture  of social  assets
- all non-productive activities  10  253
|o/w: housing  5  126
Source: Goskomstat, own estimates
Notes: 1/ witnout  agriculture
2/ tby tne ena of the year- 7 -
The data show some increase in social spending as a share of the total labor costs.  In 1993. total
registered social spending by enterprises amounted to 17  % of the total wage bill 5 (in industry -- 22%) and
to  13% of the total labor costs estimated as a  sum of the wage bill and  the payroll tax (in industry --
18%).  In 1994, these shares for the whole economy amounted to 20 and  15% correspondingly (Table
3).  This aggregate data is consistent with the results of the large enterprise  survey.  As shown by the
World  Bank survey of 420  industrial  firms  held  in  the of  summer  1994,  average per  capita social
spending in this sample were equivalent  to 18% of the wage bill.  Social spending was positively and
significantly correlated with the average cash wage.  According to this survey, very few firms, only about
5%  of the sample, did not provide any  social services,  while more  than 60%  provided five or more
various types of such services (Commander and Lee,  1995).
The data suggest that 1994 social spending in industry as percentage of the cash wages returned
to its traditional pre-reform  level exceeding 20%:6 overall reduction in real enterprise social spending
over the years of reforms did not exceed the decline in real cash wages.  This makes a dramatic contrast
to Poland, where the initial pre-reform level of social spending, of 6%,  was only as third as high, and
it has been showing some moderate decline since reforms started (Schaffer,  1995).
Under-reporting.
The presented data on the total enterprise social expenditure  is likely to be significantly under-
reported.  This happens because of  (i) insufficient enterprise coverage in Goskomstat form No.  10f used
for preparing tables 2 and 3, and (ii) statistical biases in the data provided by enterprises.
(i)  While the annual form  10f is supposed to cover the whole enterprise sector (as it follows from
the employment data) in 1994, Goskomstat was able to collect this form only from enterprises amounting
to total employment of about 85 % of the overall labor force.  One might assume that the most of largest
enterprises, being the main providers of social services, are covered by this form, and therefore above
mentioned under-reporting  is not very large.  Small firms,  and newly-emerging private businesses in
particular,  are much likely to be under-presented in Goskomstat data. This part of the enterprise sector,
however,  is less involved in the delivery of social services.
(ii)  A number of reasons. such as widespread barter transactions, the delivery of goods and services to
employees at low prices,  exclusion of depreciation and costs of renting corresponding premises from the
total  costs related to the provision  of social services,  etc.,  make the reported  social spending  volume
substantially under-estimated.  Enterprise managers had and retain incentives -- e.g. the excess wage tax -
- to include some actual expenditures made in the social sphere under their general production costs by
using  deficiencies  in  the  existing  accounting  classifications.  Additionally,  most  social services  are
provided by enterprises  on  a non-profit basis.  As a result,  the opportunity  costs of getting the same
services through independent providers might be higher.  Therefore,  the actual burden of all types of
social financing for enterprises is likely higher than that reported by Goskomstat but it probably does not
exceed 4% of GDP.
s  Including bonuses from profit.
6  Estimated  on the basis of Finance  in Russian  Federation, 1992.  - M: Goskomstat, 1993, p.30; Russian
Federation  in 1992. Statistical  Handbook.  M: Goskomstat, 1993, p.p.121, 224.-8-
Over-reporting.
There are  also certain  incentives for  enterprises  to over-report  their  social spending  in order
increase benefits through available tax deductions.  At the same time, it is very difficult to control the
actual allocation of funds between production and social purposes within enterprises. Some types of costs
are even not formally accounted for. In our survey, for example, a number of enterprises could not report
their costs of heating supply for enterprise housing; they are not accounted for separately from costs of
heat used for  production  purposes.  Funds,  which  are reported  to be  spent on social  activities,  may
actually be used quite easily for  production needs.  It seems, though,  that the overall volume of such
over-reporting  is lower than the under-reporting  discussed above.
2. FACTORS  WHICH  INFLUENCE  SOCIAL  ASSETS  RESTRUCTURING
The princinl"  groups  of factors  which  influence the process  of social assets restructuring  are
external  economic  environment  and  enterprise  internal  situation.  Among  the  external  factors
macroeconomic environment, legal framework,  financial framework and attitude of local authorities may
be  identified. The internal situation  is primarily  determined by  the enterprise's  financial situation and
position of enterprise management.
Macroeconomic environment
Macroeconomic  policy seriously  affects the  general process  of enterprise  adjustment  and the
restructuring of social assets in particular.  Tightening enterprise budget constraints as a part of successful
stabilization efforts substantially accelerates overall reductions in enterprise social spending. This includes
spending  cuts by  those enterprises  which  are doing quite  well  and  not experiencing  severe  financial
problems.  On the other hand, when the government's  financial policy is soft and the progress with the
enterprise reform is slow, even enterprises, which, at all accounts, are in poor financial shape, might be
able to continue financing social services through accumulation of arrears to  suppliers and to the budget,
obtaining soft government credits or other forms of implicit government subsidies.
Ukraine might be considered as a good example of the latter situation.  According to the IMF,
Ukrainian enterprises spent  about 4.6%  of GDP in 1994 ( i.e. measured as a share of GDP as much as
they did before reforms have started (Cheasty,  1996)) on social activities. Some reservations aside, the
opposite case might be found in Kyrgyzstan, where, as a result of the strong stabilization program,  most
enterprise non-housing social facilities were simply  closed (ADB,  1995)'.  It seems that enterprises  in
Unfortunately,  there is little evidence  regarding  the changes  in enterprise  social  spending  occurring  in the
transitional  economies  of Eastern  Europe. Only  the Polish  experience  is relatively  well documented  (Estrin  at al.,
1995). Given the radical  nature of Polish stabilization,  one might expect a quite substantial  reduction  in social
spending  by Polish  firms.  However, the paper by Estrin, Schaffer  and Singh suggests  that this did not happen.
It is not clear if this should  be considered  as an argument  against  our hypothesis  that successful  stabilization  plays
a crucial role for accelerating  decline  in social  expenditures  of enterprises. Despite  a very sound macroeconomic
policy, the Polish  economy  has been  characterized  by a number  of features,  which  unavoidably  prevent  enterprises
from full and immediate  discontinuation  of social  services delivery. The following  factors are probably of major
importance:  (i) a very low initial, i.e. pre-reform, level of enterprise  social  spending;  (ii)  powerful  labor unionsRussia, as well as in Kazakhstan (O'Keefe,  1995). implemented, on  average,  in  1993-94 a sort of an
intermediary strategy when compared to either Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan.  Some reduction in social spending
has occurred and some social facilities shut, but the scale has been much smaller than initially expected.
The reason for this can be found in quite internally contradictory economic policies conducted in both
Russia and Kazakhstan.
General institutional changes can also seriously impact on the restructuring of enterprise social
assets. The role of privatization and improvement of corporate governance mechanisms are very important
in this  regard.  At  the advanced enterprise  reform  stage and  under  transparent  ownership  rights,  the
continuation  of  social  subsidies  at  the  traditional  level,  even  if  possible  financially,  will  become
institutionally unacceptable.
One could draw  some  important conclusions  from this cross  country  analysis.  In particular,
though cuts in enterprise spending in Russia are so far quite moderate, this could change dramatically as
soon as (due to strengthening of government reform efforts) enterprise expectations regarding "prevailing
rules of the game" are modified.
Legal framework
Legal  arrangements  concerning  the  status  of  enterprise  social  assets  in  Russia  were  first
determined by the Federal Government during the process of enterprise corporatization and privatization
(Annex 2).  They  varied across different  types of social assets.  A part  of social assets (like health,
educational,  cultural  and  sport  facilities)  was  allowed  to  be  included  under  the  charter  capital  of
enterprises,  with an obligation to keep the profile of these assets unchanged. Another  group of assets,
grouping  together  housing,  attached utility networks  ( not on the territory  of enterprises),  as well as
maintenance units  of enterprises  with  all  their  so called  "material base,"  are prohibited  from  being
included in the charter capital and must be mandatorily divested to localities within a six month period
after privatization,  according to a time schedule approved  by municipal administrations.  Before such
divestiture happens, such assets are to be held on the balance sheets of enterprises. Enterprises were not
forced to have any social assets in their property (e.g.  if working collectives did not want to do so and
did not intend to include them  in the privatization  plan).  In cases where  some assets are located on
enterprise territory but are used for municipal needs, they have to be transformed into a common property
of the privatized entity and local authorities.
Differences in regional and local regulations concerning operation and funding of enterprise social
assets play a major  role in the determining of the actual legal framework in this field.  There  is much
evidence that federal norms (which themselves are fragmentary and contradictory in many cases) are often
either  violated or ignored by local authorities who actually set up their own  "rules of the game" (Bim,
1994,  Urban Institute,  1995).  For example,  in some places, local authorities insist that almost all social
assets could not be included into the charter capital of privatized enterprises, while elsewhere the process
was mainly determined by the decisions of working collectives of privatizing enterprises.
(especially  in privatized  firms); (iii) effective  government  regulation  of cash wage increases  (popivek). Thus, the
Polish developments,  as seems,  neither contradicts  nor confirms  our explanations  of variation in enterprise social
spending  patterns  observed  across  FSU countries.- 10  -
In those areas where local authorities are weak and enterprises are strong,  the federal rules are
violated in a different way.  For instance, in many cases heat supply systems (boilers), which are located
on the territory  of enterprises,  were included into the charter capital and then local authorities have had
neither access to the proper  information on these boilers'  activity (unit costs, technical characteristics)
nor  power over the supply of heat to municipal  housing and other social  facilities.  As a  result, heat
tariffs  for  such heat enterprises  are set at  a too high  level and the supply  of heat  is unstable (when
enterprise  needs  more  heat  for  production  purposes  it  reduces  supply  to  residents).  The  ban  on
reprofiling social assets, which have been included into the charter capitals of privatized  enterprises,  is
also usually violated.  In particular, many enterprise kindergartens were either reprofiled for commercial
purposes or closed down  after companies  were privatized  (Bim,  1994).  In some cases,  those assets,
which were forbidden to be included into the charter capital (housing), were in practice privatized along
with the fixed capital.
Arrangements concerning certain types of social assets are regulated by traditions. For example,
recurrent costs for enterprise medical units were traditionally financed by municipalities, while enterprises
had to compensate building maintenance and some overhead costs. Such a practice remains unchanged
in many localities.
Thus,  "the rules of the game" for social assets restructuring are only partially regulated by federal
legislation (not very consistent in itself).  In general, the actual developments are mainly determined by
the  main  players  at  regional  and  local  levels:  regional  authorities,  municipal  authorities  and  local
enterprises,  their balance of  interests and  relative  bargaining  power.  Different  fragments  of federal
regulation are used in different places, while the rest is ignored.  As a result, the legal regime for social
assets  restructuring  substantially  differs  both  from  federal  rules  and  across  municipalities.  In  the
following  sections  of the paper,  discussion  is focused not on  the  formal regulations  but  on the  real
framework  for  social  assets  restructuring.  Specifically,  local  differences  seriously  affect  financial
arrangements for both current operations and divestiture of enterprise  social assets.
Financial framework
Two principle,  yet opposing, views have been  expressed regarding financial consequences of
enterprises'  social functions.  The first,  and more traditional (Shleifer and Boycko,  1994), suggests that
the financial impact is quite negative and additional spending on social asset maintenance and operations
leads to comparative disadvantages for enterprises  which hold social assets versus those which are free
of such obligations.  The other position is that holding social assets does not highly affect enterprise
financial positions (Teplukhin, Halligan and Willer,  1995).  According to our analysis, the actual picture
varies from city to city and enterprise to enterprise.  Meaning that on the basis of the general analysis
of both  legal and financial environment,  it is not possible to  determine  potential financial  impact of
maintaining social assets on the enterprises's  financial performance because specific financial mechanisms
of  compensating  social  expenditures  vary  substantially  between  cities.  Thus,  the  consequences  for
enterprises can vary greatly.
Principle additional sources of funding for the financing of enterprise social spending have been
introduced by federal regulations and are currently uniform almost everywhere. It is the enterprises'  right
to deduct their social expenditures from both the profit tax (but not more than 50% of the tax amount
due) and from  1.5% local turnover tax, which may levied on all enterprises (and actually is introduced
now almost everywhere) by local governments to specifically finance housing and social facilities. The- 11  -
local implementation of these federal guidance varies a great deal across municipalities who use different
options for  the regulation  of the profit  tax and the turnover  tax deductions.  The following  types of
differences can be noted.
1. How costs are credited against corresponding  taxes:
a. According to actual reported expenditures of enterprises;
b. According to special norms established by municipality for housing and other social
assets maintenance and operations (for example, for housing they are measured in "rubles
per square meter").  These norms vary substantially across regions, covering from as low
as 40% of actual costs up to  l00%.8
2. How tax credit mechanisms are established:
a.  Enterprises may credit their expenditures against appropriate taxes (according to any
of the mechanisms mentioned above). If the amount of tax credits is not sufficient, local
authorities  (e.g.  in  Ryazan  or  Yaroslavl)  may  in  some  cases  reimburse  additional
enterprise spending.
b.  Enterprises  may  credit the entire  volume of their  expenditures against appropriate
taxes  (according  to any  of the  mechanisms mentioned  above in para. 1).  If these tax
credits are not enough to cover the full amount of spending, the city contributes nothing
to support  the enterprise social activity.
c.  No  transparent  rules  regarding  tax  credit  mechanism  have  been  set  and  local
authorities make individual decisions about tax deductions.  For example, as Volgograd
officials reported, there were no general rules for 1.5% turnover tax benefits in the city.
In certain cases (for example, if an enterprise  is loss-maker or works for city needs), a
decision might be made to use preferential tax rates. Otherwise,  an enterprise has to pay
the full amount of the tax due,  independent of actual social spending.
While both options "a" and "b" might be used in the framework of the existing federal legislation, option
"c" openly contradicts the federal law, according to which social expenditures of enterprises should be
deducted from the amount of 1.5% local turnover tax.
3.  How deductions from two different taxes are combined.
In most cities,  but not everywhere, the mechanism works  in a way which allows enterprises to benefit
twice from the same social spending. Turnover tax is paid before the profit tax, so turnover tax payments
automatically reduce profit tax liabilities (which makes, on the average, the effective rate for enterprises
- Besides,  in some regions. local governments  severely  restrict  the types of spending  being eligible for tax
credits. For instance  in Moscow  oblast, enterprise  spending  on heat and other  utility services  delivered  to enterprise
housing is not covered by these benefits.  As a result, only about 20% of the actual housing costs of local
enterprises  are credited against the corresponding  taxes (Kalinina, 1995).- 12 -
equal to 2/3 of a statutory rate). While enterprises  may decrease  turnover tax payments  by the amount
of their social spending, they have a right to deduct full amount  of the turnover  tax paid (according  to
a statutory  rate) in the process of calculating  their profit tax obligations. From eleven cities considered
for participating  in the World  Bank  Enterprise  Housing  Divestiture  project, eight  confirmed  that they  have
had this rule of double  benefits.
There are other sources of financial support to  enterprises in  some cities.  For example,
municipalities  sometimes  declare social assets to be divested  from enterprises, receive  federal transfers
to support these assets, and share these funds with enterprises, who actually retain the assets on their
balance  sheet. Such situations  are possible, as we will argue below, because  the term "divestiture"  is still
poorly determined  by federal regulations.
It is worth noting  that local authorities  usually  provide the above  mentioned  financial  benefits  not
only to enterprises  maintaining  and operating social assets being kept on their balance sheets (therefore
subject to divestiture),  but also when the corresponding  social assets had been included  into the charter
capital of privatized  enterprises.
In some  cases, federal  and regional  budget  transfers  are allocated  directly  to enterprises. In many
rural  settlements and  one-enterprise towns,  municipal governments still  do  not  have  adequate
administrative  capacity  to manage  corresponding  assets. This is largely  because  in these places  the largest
firms were the historic providers  of the bulk of social services. Due to this tradition,  the enterprises,  not
municipalities,  continue  to receive subsidies  from both federal  and regional  budgets and to run housing,
schools,  hospitals,  kindergartens,  etc. Governmental  transfers  for social  purposes  are the most significant
in agriculture,  coal, and defense  industry sectors (See Annex 3).
Attitude  of local authorities.
In general, city officials  are interested  in delaying  social asset divestiture  for as long as possible.
This is especially  true with regard to housing and utilities. According  to the survey, municipalities  in
about 60% of cases have attempted  to delay or stop this process (Table 6).  Nine enterprises  out of ten
that have not yet started divestiture  negotiations,  foresee  that these negotiations  would be very difficult
because  of certain  conditions  imposed  by city administrations. As a short-term  solution,  local authorities
often  try to introduce  agreements  between  enterprises  and city administrations  on joint use and financing
of social assets. In practice this means that enterprises retain the whole financial and management
responsibility  for maintenance  and operation  of social assets, while  the city contributes  from time to time
some funds if they are available  (from  federal transfers or from 1.5% turnover  tax).
In some cases, though,  local authorities  are very keen to receive  the full control over social  assets
in the city and to start developing  and managing the city social infrastructure  as a single system. They
therefore insist on social assets divestiture  even if it means an additional  financial  burden for the city.
It would be very interesting  to find out whether  there are any objective  factors,  besides personal
inclinations,  which influence  the position  of local authorities.  According  to experience  in the Enterprise
Housing  Divestiture  Project, cities dominated  by one or several large enterprises  are at both extremes.
In such cities almost all the housing and other social assets used lo be controlled  by enterprises  and, as
a result, local authorities were absolutely powerless and depended completely until recently for the
delivery of many social services on investment  decisions  of enterprises. City administrations  in these- 13 -
cases either completely reject transfer of responsibility of managing social assets from enterprises or are
much more radical  than their colleagues from the other cities in their support to the divestiture. In larger
and more diversified cities, the picture is also diverse.  For example, in the middle of 1995 the share of
divested enterprise housing in 12 cities, which were initially selected for EHDP, varied from almost zero
up to 95 %.  In general, local authorities from middle-sized and even large cities are overloaded by their
financial and managerial problems  associated with existing municipal social facilities and are therefore
quite reluctant to push for the additional burden posed by divestiture.
Position of enterprise managers.
On  the whole,  and  all  other factors  being  equal,  the  more  difficult the  enterprise  financial
situation, the larger are the pressures  for restructuring social assets. This may be spelled out in various
ways:  stronger pressure  on  local governments to accept divested social assets, introduction of various
service restrictions for non-employees, rising cost-recovery through increases in user fees and tariffs, etc.
Coopers & Lybrand (1995) provides an example of the link between coal mine profitability and the level
of cost recovery  in housing financed by  these mines.  They show,  in particular,  that  in early  1995, a
profitable mine was capable of retaining an extremely low cost recovery in housing, at the level of 7.4%.
Meanwhile, a neighboring mine, which had heavy losses, was forced to increase cost-recovery up 34.4%.
At the same time, there are a number of general characteristics of enterprise managerial attitudes
towards  social  functions  which  are  not  explained by  pure  financial  reasons  and  which  have  deeper
psychological and cultural roots.
In general, most of the enterprise managers participating in the survey assess social functions as
a significant burden.  The attitude towards different kinds of social activities is the same.  As one can see
from  Table  4,  provision  of social  benefits  associated  with holding  social  assets  are  considered  by
enterprise managers as the most difficult ones.  Social functions associated with provision of non-wage
benefits including those in kind but which do not require holding substantial social assets (e.g. food shops
with subsidized prices, transportation subsidies, direct distribution of commodities produced by enterprise
itself or received through barter at subsidized prices) constitute a much less burden than the former.  For
example,  Table 4 shows that in general it is much easier for enterprises to compensate their workers for
resort  recreation in cash than to hold recreation facilities themselves.
In  addition,  there  are  different  attitudes  towards  two  different  groups  of  social  assets.
Kindergartens, housing and dormitories are considered as a major burden by a relatively large group of
the respondents and the further fate of these assets is now the most painful issue for managers.  It is much
easier, though, for enterprises to continue holding such assets as sport facilities, cultural centers, hospitals
and clinics.
On the basis of this information, it seems that enterprises should be eager to divest social assets,
primarily  those which constitute the main burden for them.  However, our survey does not support this
view.  Only one out of 24 enterprises  reported that it planned to stop providing  all social services and
one  other had  a  clear strategy  to make  social activities self-financed.  Six more  presented a type  of
strategy  where social assets restructuring may be considered 'rational'  (meaning that these enterprises
intended to downsize or to increase cost recovery of those types of social activities which are the most
difficult for them to provide).  The rest of the sample either had no strategy at all or their strategy could
not be considered  'rational'  according to the aforementioned criterion mentioned.  Six enterprises were
not going to change anything in their social activities, and three  intended on providing  new services.- 14 -
Table 4.  The most and the least problematic types of benefits as assesses by
enterprise managers
Type of benefit  Among  3 tile most difficult  to  Among  3 the most easy to
provide (nunmber  of responses)  provide (number of responses)
Kindergartens  1  15  [  l
Housing  I10  [  O
|  Dormitories  |  7  |  O
| Recreation facilities  5  |  0
|  Canteen  with  subsidized  prices  |  5  1  3
Compensation  for  resort  23
recreation  l
Sport facilities  2  4
Cultural  center  1  0  1
Healthcare facilities  I  5
Food  shop  with  subsidized  |  2
prices012
Transportation subsidy  0  2
| Cominodities on subsidized  0  1  6
Source:  Enterprise survey
Total number of  responses:  24- 15 -
Such an outcome contradicts not only the results of the other studies in this area, but also the
answers to some other  questions in our survey.  For example, only two enterprises reported that they
were not interested in housing divestiture. This means that the others who insisted on preserving all social
functions  expressed their intentions  in an internally inconsistent way. It seems  this phenomena  has a
psychological  explanation  and  corresponds  to  traditional  paternalistic  attitude  of  Soviet  enterprise
managers towards working collectives.  Even if in reality managers take some actions to divest social
assets,  they do not consider it appropriate to admit that they are going to leave their workers  without
some form of social support from the enterprise.  This outcome is consistent with the results of the large
World Bank enterprise survey where more than half of the managers of responding firms explained their
continuation social benefits provision by non-economic  factors (Commander and  Lee,  1995).  Certain
objective reasons are definitely behind such social and ethical preferences of enterprise managers.  The
necessity to preserve good relations with local and regional authorities seems to play the key role here.
Thus as managers have quite internally inconsistent feelings about divestiture, it is not surprising that their
practical steps towards transferring social assets would not be very consistent and active,  and they could
be easily blocked by local authorities.
3. POSSIBLE WAYS OF SOCIAL ASSETS RESTRUCTURING
Options available.  There are three possible solutions to the problem of enterprise social assets.
Enterprise  social assets can: (i) be kept by  enterprises  with or without changes  in principles  of their
utilization,  financing and  ownership;  (ii) be transferred  to municipalities  for  further  privatization  of
ownership and management; (iii) be handed over to municipalities to be kept under municipal ownership
and management.
A significant portion of the overall social assets has been included in the founding capital of the
former  state enterprises and privatized  along with the rest of the company (productive assets).  Insiders
consider (or  at  least used to) 9 such privatization  deals as beneficial for themselves  because they  saw
profitable opportunities of either using or selling the associated real estate.  Insiders voluntarily undertook
the responsibility  for  maintaining these assets. There was no  reason, therefore,  for  the government to
consider plans  of their divestiture  or  continue  subsidization of their maintenance,  including implicit
subsidization through tax benefits.  Among social assets which have been most frequently included in the
founding capital of privatized firms are sport, recreation, and entertainment facilities.  The costs of their
operation might amount up to 25 % of the current total costs of maintaining enterprise social assets.  (See
Annex 4).
According to the survey, enterprises consider various ways to use social assets at their disposal,
including downsizing certain activities and making them self-financing.  Among the methods to increase
cost recovery, the most popular has been to attract new clients from non-employees and to increase user
fees for  them.  The possibilities  to  increase  fees from  the enterprise  employees  and  to  reprofile  and
commercially use some social assets are also considered, though less frequently.
9  Sometimes  when  the owners  change  their mind. they manage  to make  a deal with the local administration
and to sell these social  assets  to the city at symbolic  prices; but in other cases they have to suffer from the results
of their previous  decisions  regarding  privatization,  which  have proven  unprofitable.- 16 -
In those cases where enterprises  are keen to divest their facilities (e.g. in entertainment  or other
non-core  social  activities),  the government  should  support  this transfer,  while  not accepting  responsibility
for these assets.  Instead, the government should  develop and execute a  privatization plan for
corresponding  assets  based on the general principles  of the overall Russian  privatization  program. This
possibility  is envisaged  in Russian  legislation  (Annex  2).
There is, however, a large volume of social assets which either: (i) cannot be legally included
into the charter capital of privatized enterprises; or, (ii) were not included for some reasons at the
moment  of privatization;  and/or  (iii) immediate  privatization  of which is not feasible. We will argue  that
the best option for this kind of social assets in a majority of cases would be divestiture to  local
authorities. While housing  and utilities  constitute  the largest portion  of such assets, the same  is true for
the part of educational  and medical  facilities.
Why  divestiture,  not 2rivatization. There  are a number  of reasons  why, for certain  types  of social
assets, immediate  wide-scale  privatization  is not feasible  or efficient.  This issue is discussed  below using
the example  of housing  and supporting  utility networks, where most problems are concentrated,  but the
same factors  afflict, though to a smaller extent, other types of social assets.
(i)  Legal regulation. Legislation  on privatization  of apartments  in Russia  was formed  in a way which
is not very favorable for development  of efficient private owners.  It reflected the peculiarities  of the
social  environment  (historically  strong  tenants' rights), in which  legislation  had been developed. Tenants
cannot be forced to privatize their apartments  because  privatization  is considered as a voluntary  action
which they can do any time in the future. Meanwhile,  apartments  may not be privatized by outsiders.
There are several consequences  of legal arrangements  in this area.
- Privatization  of apartments  changes  nothing in the actual  ownership  and management  of
the whole building. For example,  the building itself  may still be considered  as municipal  property  even
if all individual  apartments  are privatized.
- The only currently available legal form for privatization  of  existing multi-apartment
buildings  in Russia is the formation  of condominium  associations.  These, however, are very difficult  to
form on the basis of already  occupied  houses  (Ryazan  is the leading  Russian  city in condo  formation  with
less than 30 condominiums  formed by early 1996). Second, they are not the most stable and efficient
form of private ownership  for housing  under existing  conditions  in Russia. Factors  such as different  level
of  incomes and demands of condo members, undeveloped housing market, lack of  professional
management,  etc. will affect the condos' ability  to enforce  their ownership  rights.
- Many  households  are not even  interested in free housing privatization  because their
rights are well protected  against eviction, even without  a formal title for the apartment.
(ii)  Subsidization. Housing  in Russia is a heavily subsidized  sector. On average  at the end of 1995,
residents  covered  between 20 and 30% of actual housing and utility costs. The rest was covered by
subsidies  either from local budgets  (for municipal  housing)  or from enterprises  (for enterprise  housing).
Residential  utility tariffs are the same in municipal  and enterprise  buildings. The pace of elimination  of
subsidies  is limited  by both the general level of population  incomes  and by political  constrains. For these
reasons, many Eastern European  countries, including Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, have  found it
difficult  to eliminate  housing  subsidies  simultaneously  with overall price liberalization. As a result.  these- 17 -
are still the largest subsidies remaining in fiscal systems, and these countries have chosen a very cautious
approach to their step-by-step elimination.  Preservation of subsidies limits the possibility and desirability
of truly housing privatization:
- Even if apartments and buildings from the enterprise housing  stock are privatized,  the
responsibility for housing and similar subsidies is to be divested to municipal governments. In Russia and
some other FSU states, when tenants privatize their apartments, it does not lead to any change in monthly
household domicile expenditures.  According to the existing regulations,  any form of discrimination in
maintenance/utility  tariffs based on the ownership rights of the tenants is not allowed: all of them have
to pay the same bills."'  This holds true for both privatized apartments and privatized buildings in a form
of condominiums.
- The  remaining  subsidization will unavoidably shift  incentives of actual and potential
building  owners.  They  would not  feel  too much  responsibility  for  cost-effective  management  and
maintenance of their property,  but would have strong incentives to fight for extracting the full amount
of budget subsidies.  The situation is aggravated by the fact that tenants are billed according to special
norms  of consumption,  not according to actual consumption.  As such they do not have incentives for
more  efficient use  of heat,  water,  gas.  In this  circumstances,  while municipalities  retaining  major
financial responsibility  for  housing, they  should  be more  interested  in rationalization of the housing
sector than private owners.
(iii)  Technical reasons.  Provision of utility services has been organized in Russia in a way which is
not very suitable for transition to private ownership of buildings.  In most places, for example, heating
is not supplied from small boilers serving one or few buildings;  rather,  both municipal and enterprise
housing heat supply is organized through centralized heating systems. This necessitates the existence of
one or several big heat suppliers  and long networks connecting them with final users.  Heat supply is
interrelated across buildings and tenants do not have the technical possibility to regulate heat delivery in
a decentralized manner.  Some buildings lack even heat exchangers and water circulating within building
heating  systems  is not separated  from  external pipes.  (As  a  result,  tenants have almost  no  way to
influence delivery of heat or the quality of incoming water, which can badly influence pipes within their
buildings.) Changes, which have to be introduced in this system to protect the rights of apartment owners,
require certain investments and cannot happen overnight.
(iv)  Monopolization of maintenance. Provision of maintenance services were originally organized to
serve the needs  of the centralized,  state-owned and  state-managed system.  Though  certain  efforts to
undertake reforms have been made recently in many localities, the level of artificial monopolization in
this area is still quite high. Typically,  the market of municipal housing stock maintenance is officially
shared  by  several municipal  maintenance  companies  and  each building  is assigned  to one  particular
service  provider.  Enterprises  usually  have  maintenance  units  in  their  structure,  which  provide
corresponding  services  to  the  enterprise  housing  stock.  Though  it  is  less  difficult  to  overcome
monopolization  in provision  of maintenance  services than  in utility  services,  the  absence of reliable
alternative sources for these services may also  be considered as a barrier to  immediate efficient housing
privatization.
M()  And sometimes  even lower. For example, to push apartment  privatization, authorities of the city of
Novocherkassk  made a decision  to decrease  by 3% all the rent and utility payments  for the owners of privatized
flats.- 18 -
Why divestiture, and not "let the market decide"? There is one popular argument which contends
that there  is no need for government in transitional economies to interfere in the area of social benefits
(including housing) provided by for former state enterprises.  The market itself would sort everything out
anyway.  Reasons for this conclusion are that: 1) firms in the established market economies also provide
a number of non-cash benefits as a part of their overall compensation package; 2) social benefits are one
of the ways in which  firms  compete on  the labor  market and  thus enforced divestiture  could affect
mechanisms of market competition; 3) firms in transition have proven their ability to respond to changing
economic  signals and  there  is no reason  to  believe that  they would  deal with the problem  of social
benefits on their own-less efficiently than they have with other adjustment problems  (Schaffer, 1995).
While for a number of non-core benefits this type of logic seems to hold, the provisioning of core
benefits, foremost in housing, by SOEs and former SOEs makes the situation  in transitional economies
and corresponding firms very much different from that in the countries with developed markets.  The key
difference is that those benefits,  a real burden for the firms and a headache for governments in transition,
are not a part of firms'  compensation packages."'  Enterprises must provide these services not only to
their employees, but also to a substantial number of other residents in surrounding localities.  Moreover,
they have to provide these services at heavily subsidized prices,  i.e.- they deliver public and subsidized
housing services directly instead of the local governments.  Due to political constraints, there is no hope
that these subsidies will be terminated in short run.  'To let the market decide'  in such environment is
the equivalent to give firms permission to either withdraw unilaterally or to substantially reduce delivery
of some basic public services.  This option is considered as politically and socially unacceptable by most
governments in transitional economies.  The whole problem of divestiture is derived from the necessity
to design  a  procedure  that  would  substitute enterprises  by  municipalities  in a  way  which preserves
continuation of basic services and takes into account major fiscal and institutional consequences of such
a substitution.
There are other important considerations which require governments'  involvement in solving the
problem of enterprise social benefits and, in particular,  in accelerating divestiture.
(i)  There is a serious difference in the provisioning of social benefits in money and in kind, specially
where  the latter  includes holding  social assets. Cash benefits  are very flexible  and can be adjusted in
accordance with corporate financial situations.  If these are reduced,  for example,  it does not effect the
overall abilities to provide social services in the locality. This is not, however, true for social assets.  It
is virtually  impossible  to  divest  social  assets  in the  short  run  if financial  situation  of  enterprise  is
worsening.  The manner in which  enterprises deal with the problem in such situations is to simply stop
operating  and/or maintaining these social assets.  Where enterprises  are the main  providers  of social
services (or at least play an important role therein) in many localities, such shutdowns could negatively
affect general social conditions those locales.
This is especially true for housing where residents have no other  alternative and enterprise reductions
in maintenance funding lead to a general deterioration of living conditions. The other side of the coin is
that badly performing enterprises  with big social assets substantially increase their lobbying power and
can force the government to provide  financial assistance to  prevent bankruptcy simply due just  to the
possibility of dangerous social consequences of corporate closure. Taking into account all negative social
l l  The level of social  expenditures  to cash  wages  per capita in Russia  is 3-4 times  higher than that in major
Western European countries as reported by Schaffer (1995).- 19  -
and political consequences of such situations (as well as financial instability of all the production sector
in Russia) it is much preferable to undertake divestiture in normal, not emergency, conditions, preparing
all the necessary financial arrangements,  documentation and logistical preconditions.
(ii)  Such social assets as accumulated housing stock can not be used in Russia as a tool of competition
in the labor market. -As mentioned above, enterprises have no right to either evict those employees who
left  the enterprises  or to  increase  rent payments from  them.  They must  also  follow  local policies
regarding cost recovery  increases. Any substantial revision of such arrangements  is hardly politically
acceptable.  It would  be considered  as discriminatory  of the housing  rights  of tenants  in enterprise
housing, which still forms at least 30% of the urban housing stock. Newly constructed housing may be
included  into the charter capital of enterprises and can be used in a more  flexible way to support the
enterprise labor policies.
(iii)  In some specific sectors,  the  right  of enterprises,  in practice,  to hold  social assets  results in
substantial negative externalities.  For example, railroads in Russia hold, fund, and operate a huge social
infrastructure,  which badly affects the level of railway tariffs.  In turn,  the level of train tariffs is now
one  of the  main obstacles for  growth  in domestic  interregional trade  and  improvement of enterprise
competitiveness.
Thus, the problem of social assets, which are simultaneously (i) not included in the charter capital
of enterprises,  (ii) cannot be immediately privatized and/or (iii) are heavily subsidized, is a very painful
one.  Only two types of solutions,  from our point of view, are possible to remedy this situation.  Either
enterprises  continue  to hold these social assets  on their balance (with no  right to  make any strategic
decisions about these assets and full or partial financial and managerial responsibility for their operation
and  maintenance)  and  enjoy  some  financial  benefits  established  by  transparent  and  fair  rules;  or
municipalities take over these assets, which means full responsibility for their further  fate, and finance
them from general tax revenues.  We will argue that from a long-term perspective the latter  option is
better for enterprises and economy as a whole.  However, it must be seen as a transitional strategy that
is accompanied by measures to push the ownership,  financing, and management into the private sector.
4.  CONSEQUENCES  OF DIVESTITURE FOR ENTERPRISES
We have more information from the survey to analyze the process and consequences of enterprise
housing divestiture.  In this  section, we will use the example of this critical  sector of enterprise  social
assets  to draw  some additional  conclusions.  Most  of the  enterprises  in the sample  are interested  in
divestiture of their housing.  Most, though, are still in the process  of divestiture and have not completed
it. Thus we may only use their estimates on potential consequences of this process.  Enterprise managers,
however,  seem to take this process very seriously and almost all of them (20-21 from 24) were able to
give their estimates regarding the possible effect housing divestiture might have on different  aspects of
enterprise performance  (Table 5).  In a number of cases,  enterprise managers,  as follows  from their
answers, have a different views on potential consequences of divestiture.  In our view, these differences
reflect the fact that managers' attitude towards social services in Russia has been a subject of a substantial
adjustment process over last 3 years.  This change in attitude is not completed yet and various groups of
managers are at different levels of their adjustment.- 20 -
Table 5.  Potential consequences  of enterprise housing divestiture
as assessed by enterprise managers
Issues  Total  Assessment of consequences (number of responses)
number of
responses  decrease  increase  no influence
Financial burden  21  16  2  3
Managerial burden  21  19  0  2
Opportunities to hire  21  7  2  12
workers
Prices  20  9  0  11
Source: Enterprise survey
Table 6.  Sources of resistance to enterprise housing divestiture
as assessed by enterprise managers
Resistance  YES  NO
from  the side of.  (number of responses)  (number of responses)
local adminiistration  12  9
enterprise workers,  3  18
specifically:
enterprise managers  0
trade union  I
workers of housing  2
maintenance unit
Source:  Enterprise survey
Total number  of responses:  21- 21 -
Table 7.  Conditions included in housing divestiture agreements
between enterprises and municipalities





Divestiture of housing in a good  9  4
technical shape
Divestiture of heat and hot water  10  6
supply systems
Divestiture of enterprise housing  10  4
maintenance units
Sharing of maintenance costs  2  I
Sharing of capital repair costs  4  2
Sharing of utility costs  2
Continuation of housing maintenance  2  1
and capital repair on the expense of
enterprise
Continuation of housing maintenance  5
and capital repair on the expense of
municipality
Continuation  of utility services  3
provision on the expense of enterprise
Continuation of utility services  3
provision on the expense of
municipality
Total number of enterprises in the process of housing divestiture
Source: Enterprise survey- 22 -
Financial  impact. As a result of the aforementioned  tax treatment  and varying  enterprise  financial
situations,  the financial  consequences  of divestiture  vary on case  by case  basis. Three  enterprises  reported
that divestiture  would make no impact on their financial situations 12,  two even thought that financial
pressure would be harder.  Most  enterprises,  though, said that the financial  result of housing  divestiture
would be positive.  According  to the general estimates, the enterprise sector as a whole is expected  to
gain only about  0.5 percent of GDP from the divestiture  process  in the short term. However, individual
enterprises that provide a lot of housing will get substantial net benefits -- up to 70 percent of their
current gross expenditures  on housing (See Annex  4).
Administrative  impact.  Managers are more uniform in their answers about the managerial
consequences  of divestiture.  The bulk of them agreed  that managerial  burden  would decrease.  This is only
natural, taking into account that according  to the survey more than 7 % of enterprise  labor was involved
in the maintaining  and operation  of enterprise  housing  (either full time or accounting  for more than half
of their working  time). Full employment  in both housing  and other social activities  amounted  to almost
18% of total labor.  According  to the Urban Institute  (1995), about 20% of senior management  time is
typically  spent on an enterprise housing related  activities.
Impact on the attraction of employees. Managers  do not think that housing divestiture  would
necessarily  limit their opportunities  to hire workers. More than a half of managers  think that it would
have no influence  at all. Taking  into account  that many residents  of enterprise housing  are not enterprise
employees" 3 and enterprises  have no right to evict the residents  or to increase the rent payment if the
residents  leave the enterprise,  this should  be no surprise.  Increasing  competition  on the labor market and
worker downsizing  by many enterprises should  be considered as important  factors that dramatically
change the overall labor market.  In two cases, managers consider divestiture as a way to increase
opportunities  to hire workers; perhaps  because  this improves  the financial  performance  of the enterprise.
However, this situation varies, as 7 managers feel that divestiture would limit their abilities to hire
workers; and in one case it was the reason for the enterprise not to initiate divestiture  at all.
Workers themselves are also not very interested  in holding  enterprise housing (Table 6). Only
three enterprises  reported that their working collectives  objected  to the divestiture  process. In only one
of these cases it was the trade union who protested;  in the other two resistance came from housing
maintenance  units of the enterprises. This is quite natural, as enterprises in many cases have reduced
their expenditures  on housing  below minimally necessary  levels and almost stop maintaining  it, which
leads  to deterioration  of the housing  stock and decreasing  comfort  for residents.  So, even  those employees
who live in the enterprise  housing  do not consider  divestiture  of the buildings  to municipalities  as a threat
to their benefit package. They are quite sure that after divestiture  rent payments  will remain intact and
housing services  will not deteriorate  further.
Impact on prices.  About a half of respondents  see no connection  between enterprise housing
divestiture  and the level of prices for their products.  The other half, however, considers divestiture  as
a possible source to decrease  costs. They support the idea that in many  cases housing  divestiture  might
have a direct positive influence  on enterprise  competitiveness. It is interesting  that enterprise  managers
12  Because  of offsetting  tax liabilities.
13  Employees  or retired  employees  are living  in 56%  of apartments  of enterprise  housing  in surveyed  cities
(of which  the share  of pensioners  amounted  to 14%).- 23 -
have begun to understand  the interrelation  between the level of their social spending and their market
competitiveness.  This strict division in  views among managers, as mentioned above. should be
interpreted as a confirmation  of the fact that during last 3 years a radical shift in managers' attitude
towards delivery of social services  had been underway  but the change is not completed  yet.
Impact on wages.  This question  was not asked  directly in the survey, but data provided  by
enterprises and answers to other questions reveal some indicators in this area.  It was expected that
enterprise savings  deriving from reduction  in their social spending  will facilitate  cash wage adjustments,
which, in its turn, will support reduction  of budget subsidies  for social sector  and general public sector
reforms.  Following survey results, enterprise managers have not in practice enacted such a wage
adjustment  to compensate  employees  for reductions  in real social spending. Only I out of 17 firms that
had recently  reduced  delivery  of social  services  said that they compensated  employees  through  higher  cash
wage. The same  findings  have  been revealed  by the Urban  Institute  (1995), which  reported  that managers
prefer to spend corresponding  savings  on purposes  other than wage increases  considered  as being more
important  for enterprise surviving.
It seems  that absence  of a link between  reductions  in enterprise  social expenditure  and an increase
in cash wages could  be explained  by the fact that the dynamics  of the real cash wage  has been  determined
so far by other factors.  This is primarily by average prevailing  wage levels in corresponding  localities,
which in turn largely follow the price level of basic consumer  goods. Adjustments  in the cost of living
without  reductions  in non-cash  benefits  influence  overall enterprise  wage  policies  (Commander,  Dhar and
Yemtsov, 1995). Such  implicit  indexation  of wages was rather effective  in Russia in 1992-94  and caused
a high level of real wage stability  during the period of price liberalization  and high and volatile  inflation.
This may suggest that, while managers  do not currently use their savings from social spending  cuts for
wage adjustments, they may conduct different types of wage policies under different circumstances.
Specially  if cost recovery in housing is increased  substantially  and housing expenditures  become a real
factor in determining  the cost of living. It is then likely that growth in employee  housing expenditures,
such as between 1992-94 with food expenditures, would be an effective determinant of managerial
policies regarding cash wage adjustments.
5.  CONSEQUENCES  OF DIVESTITURE  FOR MUNICIPALITIES  AND ECONOMY AS A
WHOLE
Divestiture  and policy reforms. Various components  of the Russian  public sector require radical
changes  in their operational  and managerial  principals.  Some presently  public-funded  services  should
be taken  out from the public sector completely  (housing).  Others should expect either an increase  in cost
recovery (child care) or emerging of more flexible co-existence  of public and private providers (health
care. education). It might be difficult  to achieve  these changes  without  prior transferring  social assets
under full public control, i.e. without divestiture. First experience  with housing  reforms in Russia has
demonstrated  the practical advantages  of having  enterprise  housing  divested  to municipalities.  The latter
currently  have more managerial  capacity  and more incentives  to push for housing  privatization,  increase
in cost recovery, establishing  housing allowances  for poor households,  etc. It may sound controversial,
but the re-establishing  of full public control over some sectors such as housing could be viewed  as an
important  facilitator for success of subsequent  privatization. Even when enterprises  have to support a
large housing stock, housing remains  a sideline activity for them.  Enterprises  do not see themselves  as
the promoters  of any housing  reforms. For them, the preferable  policy in this field is to be a passive. and- 24 -
not necessarily  accurate, follower of recommendations  coming from local governments.  The principle
adjustment  on the enterprise's part has been  occurring  through the simple  cutting of funding  for housing
maintenance. As a result, enterprise housing in Russia is on average in worse physical shape than
municipal  one, has a slower rate of unit privatization,  and has its tenants with less access to housing
allowances".
Gross potential  fiscal impact  of divesture. An analysis of enterprise social spending structures
demonstrates  that the total incremental  fiscal  burden from full-scale  divestiture  will  be much  smaller than
the current level of enterprise spending on social services. It could be argued that the potential gross
fiscal impact is not more than 60% of the amount  reported by the enterprises, i.e. close to 2% of GDP.
This is due to the fact, as it was partially  discussed  above,  that various types of social spending  currently
financed  by enterprises  are non-transferable  (i.e. they are not subject  to divestiture)  either in financially
or physically. These types of services  include:
(i)  Those services financed not  from  enterprise revenues but  from budget transfers.  The
corresponding assets  might be transferred, but  it will not  impose extra budget costs upon if  it
accompanied  by redistributing  the transfers from enterprises  to municipalities.
(ii)  Those services  constituting  an important  part of the overall compensation  package  of employees
as non-wage  benefits. Under the existing  economic  climate, it is unlikely that managers  of state-owned
and formerly  state-owned  enterprises  will insist either on divestiture  of these  services  or their substantial
reduction  because  the assets are not considered  as a real burden by enterprise  management. One might
expect  that real cuts will happen  on their own only in the medium  term as a result of substantial  changes
in both corporate governance  regimes and taxation.
(iii)  Those social assets remaining  in the enterprises' possession  as a result of their privatization  by
enterprises.
(iv)  Those social assets, which should not remain in public possession in the market economy  and
must be privatized in case of divestiture.
Further, in some cases, the municipal  costs of supporting  divested  assets might be smaller than
those of enterprises.  This is due to the fact that a part of social assets, owned by  enterprises, is
underutilized  and overstaffed." 5
Potential  fiscal impact of divestiture  for local and federal budgets.  Since  late 1993, cities have
gained access to two new instruments  to aid in the financing  of social assets.  One is the local tax for
1'1  From  9 cities  which  provided  information  on this  issue  in 5 cases  privatization  in municipal  housing  stock
was  higher  than  in enterprise  one, in 2 cases  it was  equal  and in 2 cases  privatization  was  higher  in enterprise
housing  stock.
For instance,  in the Kyrgyz  Republic,  teachers'  salaries  in kindergartens  managed  by enterprises  are 10-
50%  higher  than  those  in municipal  kindergartens.  If the whole  kindergarten  system  were  rationalized  to bring
enterprise  kindergartens  to equivalent  current  municipal  expenditure  level  with  respect  to food,  salaries,  and  utility
spending,  the  corresponding  savings  would  amount  to 20%  of the current  total  costs  of supporting  kindergartens.
(ADB  & Associates,  1995)- 25 -
support of social assets, a 1.5% tax levied on all enterprise sales; another is federal transfers for social
asset divestiture. This means that the additional  financial burden is shared between local and federal
budgets.  Three different situations  of such cost-sharing  should  be considered:
(i)  Though the effective rate for turnover tax is much lower than statutory 1.5% (close to  I %
according to our estimates), the total revenues  from this tax are still quite substantial. For six cities
involved in EHDP, the tax provided on average about 10% of the total budget revenues including
transfers from federal and regional budgets. This new source could  be potentially  used to fund additional
amount of housing divested from enterprises. In this case, the average net costs to local governments
of the overall divestiture process would be on the order of only 3-4% percent of current total regional
budget  expenditures  (0.6% of GDP).  This gap would have to be covered by either federal transfers or
households  through an increase  in cost recovery .The  effect on individual  cities (especially  one-enterprise
towns), however, could be quite different. In some cases a new financial  burden for certain cities may
be simply unaffordable.
(ii)  Since its introduction  in late 1993, municipalities  collected quite a lot of revenues from the
turnover tax,  but actual divestiture was very slow. These additional revenues were used to fund
maintenance  and operation  of the existing  municipal  housing. As a result, local authorities  put themselves
in  a  much more difficult financial situation regarding further divestiture than could be  if recent
introduction  of the turnover  tax had been accompanied  by the same  rate of actual  transferral  of enterprise
assets.  According  to our estimate, if the cities increase the effective  tax rate of the turnover  tax up to
1.5% and eliminate  remaining  profit tax exemptions,  they will be able to raise about  0.7-0.8% of GDP
as additional  budget revenues. The full scale divestiture  completion,  however, will require about  2 % of
GDP in incremental  expenditures. It is quite likely that municipalities  will try to fund the remaining
fiscal gap of about 1.2% of GDP or 6-7% of the overall regional  budget spending  by demanding  support
through the federal budget transfers.
(iii)  Some local officials  argue that not only recurrent  costs but also certain amount  of capital  repair
of transferred assets should be funded.  Enterprises  did not maintain  their housing stock as needed, so
local officials assume that some additional investments in rehabilitation  will be necessary just after
divestiture  to compensate  consequences  of recent poor maintenance. When such adjustment  for capital
repair is done (0.4% of GDP), the total annual fiscal gap for cities as a result of divestiture  might be
estimated as 10% of the existing regional  budgets.  Correspondingly,  this amount, being an equivalent
to 1.2% of GDP, should be considered  as the upper limit  for the amount  of the federal  transfers allocated
across municipalities  to support divestiture.
Federal transfers of this magnitude  are justifiable  only if all remaining  housing and other assets
have been accepted  by municipalities. Recent developments  in this field demonstrate  that requests for
the federal assistance  filed by cities are growing  much  faster than the real rate of divestiture,  and that the
federal  government  does not have institutional  capacity  for proper evaluating  real municipal  needs  in such
transfers.  Cities' requests for federal transfers in 1994 amounted to 20.7 trln rbl. or 3.3% of GDP
(Urban Institute, 1995), while not more than a quarter of the overall enterprise housing stock was
divested in 1992-94. After consideration  of these municipal  requests, the Russian Ministry of Finance
allocated 12.1 trln (2.0% of GDP) for this purposes  in 1994 budget, but later it disbursed only 4.5 trln
during the year or 37% of the budgeted amount. Given the slow rate of divestiture, one can argue that
this was a sufficient  amount.  To push divestiture,  the federal government  has had to develop a rnuch
smaller but much better targeted program of federal assistance,  which would account  for real variation- 26 -
across municipalities  in tax base, divestiture  rate, and the stock of enterprise housing.
6. PACE  AND BARRIERS  FOR DIVESTITURE
Real rate of housing  divestiture  in Russia. Russian  housing  statistics  are very much in flux, so
it is not very clear how much  housing was actually  divested  to municipalities. The report by the Urban
Institute  (1995)  estimates  that only 20-25%  of the initial  enterprise  housing  stock was  divested  in 1991-94.
Evidence  from various surveys  has demonstrated  that the actual  estimate  might  be closer  to the lower end
of this interval. Our survey in December of 1994 showed that the share of enterprise housing in the
surveyed  cities was still above  40% 16 The large enterprise  survey held in summer  of 1994  revealed  that
by that time less than 5% of enterprises  actually transferred  any of their social assets (Commander  and
Lee, 1995).  Only one from 24 enterprises participating in our small survey in December 1994 had
completed  divestiture  of a portion  of its housing  stock by that time. The rest either still had been running
negotiations  with local authorities  or had not even  begun them yet. All figures  prove that, in early 1995,
at least 35  % of the total urban housing stock was still financed  by enterprises. 17 In addition,  divestiture
in rural areas was even slower (See Annex 3).  However, a part of the housing which is described as
being financed by enterprises is, in fact, controlled and financed by various federal ministries (e.g.
Defence, Interior), and this housing is not subject to divestiture.
Barriers for divestiture. While enterprises are generally interested in the process of housing
divestiture, local authorities, as we discussed above, are reluctant to accept enterprise housing.  The
situation with enterprises in the process of divestiture  negotiations  is described  in Table 7.  Two main
tools are used by local administrations  to impede divestiture.
(i)  All the housing is declared to be divested (which means little as formally housing is only on
corporate balance sheets,' 8 not in their property), but enterprises are forced to keep responsibility  for
maintenance  and operation of the same housing stock.  As one can see from Table 7, it was envisaged
in the divestiture  agreements  that enterprises  are going  to continue  maintenance  and capital  repair on their
own expense  in two cases from 11 and continue  utility services  provision  on their own expense  in three
cases from 11. However, as the definition  of divestiture is very unclear and a variety of compromise
solutions (as cost sharing agreements, for example)  are legally possible. Local authorities use these
instruments  to delay the actual divestiture.
(ii)  As preliminary conditions for actual divestiture, local authorities insist on a huge amount of
capital repair to both the actual housing stock and utility networks be financed and carried out by
enterprises.  It is impossible  to determine  in general what amount  of repair work is reasonable  and what
not,  but this requirement  can be easily used by local authorities  to delay divestiture if they would like
to.  Such conditions, being very frequently included in divestiture agreements, lead to a number of
conflicts.  If the enterprise has no money and no ability to carry out repair work, the municipality
sometimes  demands  to acquire  some additional  property  to compensate  these  costs. As the mayor of one
of the cities admitted, "if it (the enterprise) has no money, we can take cars, tractors, administrative
6  The  enterprise  housing  share  in the total  urban  housing  stock  initially  amounted  to about  45% in 1990.
7  This also  includes  some  housing  financed  by federal  ministries,  such  as Ministry  of Defence.
18  In Russia, "na balanse" means that the firm has use rights, along with the responsibilities  for
financing,  operating and maintaining  the asset, but technically  does not own it.- 27 -
buildings".  Complaints  for the same  treatment  were expressed  by the respondents  in the  survey. The other
conflicting  issue is divestiture  of enterprise housing  maintenance  units. Most of the enterprises  have no
problem with transferring  employees  from this unit to the municipality  (divested  maintenance  units are
usually included into existing municipal  maintenance  structures  or reorganized  into separate municipal
enterprises),  though employees  themselves  sometimes  have different attitude, as mentioned  above. The
conflict is around the amount of assets (workshops, tools), which should be divested to municipalities
along with housing. All these conflicts are quite sufficient  to substantially  delay the actual divestiture.
7. NECESSARY  MEASURES  TO ACCELERATE  DIVESTITURE
Divestiture  is a very complicated  and painful  process  involving  a good  deal of financial,  logistical,
and administrative  issues. Simple  solutions are here not appropriate.  The solving of some aspects  of the
problem may simplify control over the process and can create additional incentives  to push divestiture
further:
(i)  Definition of divestiture should be legally clarified.  Local authorities may have a right to
conclude co-financing  agreements  with enterprises and leave certain functions for maintenance  and
operation  of social  assets with them. Such arrangements  should not be considered  as divestiture  though.
Divestiture  means transferring  not only the use rights but also financial  and managerial  responsibilities
to municipalities. Only in these cases should cities be eligible for federal transfers and other forms of
support allocated  for this purpose.
(ii)  An institutional  framework to solve conflicts between local authorities and enterprises in the
process of preparation  and implementation  of divestiture  must be established. These  problems  should  be
probably solved on the regional level with the involvement,  if necessary, of federal authorities  but the
existence  of disagreements  should not be used to delay divestiture  forever.
(iii)  The methods  of estimation  of the net fiscal consequences  of divestiture  should be improved to
make the overall picture more transparent  for local authorities,  who often  do not know  how much extra
funds they will receive  as a result of elimination  of local turnover  and profit tax benefits. This also will
help to improve  accuracy  of regional  requests for the federal  transfers filed with the Ministry of Finance.
The divestiture  of enterprise social assets imposes additional  financial  and managerial  pressures
on local authorities.  According  to the survey  of municipalities,  which examined  this problem with regard
to housing divestiture,  even  the existing  level of budget  subsidies  for the housing  sector is considered  as
a serious  or even unaffordable  fiscal burden. According  to city officials, if the housing  divestiture  would
be completed  and the cost recovery  level remains unchanged,  the share of the budget allotted  to housing
subsidies would have to increase significantly, perhaps double or triple.  As mentioned  above,  such
estimates  are on average  substantially  biased  upwards. This is, in particular, due to the underestimation
of additional  tax revenues  associated  with divestiture. More active  policy reforms can potentially ease
excessive  budget pressures  derived from existing housing  subsidies. Two types of activities should be
given top priority:
(i) Increase  in cost recovery. By the time of the survey, cost recovery  in the housing  sector of surveyed
cities was between  4 and 16% (despite the fact that the cities had the legal right to have cost recovery
of 20%). By early 1996, with the legal right to have 60% cost recovery, the general level amounted  to- 28 -
between  20 and 30%, while some  cities had achieved  40% by the end of 1995. While an increase  in cost
recovery will require more spending  on housing allowances  to protect vulnerable  households, growth
in  housing tariffs on  the whole would eventually transfer a  part of  the  financial burden  from
municipalities  to residents. Ultimately,  full cost recovery is the only source of sustainable  financing  for
the sector.  Population  income levels, however, put objective  limits to the pace of this process.
(ii) Policy  and institutional  reforms. Current institutional  arrangements  in the Russian social sector are
far from optimal and lead to huge losses in efficiency. Additional  losses arise from poor technologies
used in this sector. Financial  analysis shows that it would be difficult  to insure a substantial increase  in
cost recovery, and therefore reduction, in housing subsidies,  without implementing  a wide range of
policy  and institutional  reforms, as well  as investing  in the existing  housing  stock  to increase  its efficiency
(Freinkman,  Tolstopyatenko,  1996).  This means  that divestiture  would be unaffordable  and, as a result,
unsustainable  in the long run without  accelerating  wide-scale  housing and other public sector reforms.
In many locations,  these problems are quite well understood  by authorities. Two types of activities  are
considered  at the local level as a possible  way to deal with them.  First, local authorities  try to decrease
losses  by encouraging  saving of resources, first of all energy, which includes  introduction  of new energy-
and water-saving  technologies. Second, savings can be received as a result of policy and institutional
reforms, specifically:
- demonopolization  of the maintenance market, the attraction of private capital and
privatization  of municipal  units in this area;
- better regulation  of utilities as natural monopolies;
- ownership changes in the housing sector: creation of condominiums  (as more radical
changes are  prevented by  the  concept of  voluntary and  potentially endless apartment
privatization);
*  management  changes,  including  the introduction  of private management.
Conclusions
This paper provides an analysis of available  policy options with regard to the restructuring  of
enterprise  social  assets. It argues that these options  are different  depending  on the type  of provided  social
benefits; while some assets and corresponding  services  are expected  to remain intact and continue  to be
a part of a traditional  labor compensation  package,  other assets  either have  to be privatized  or mandatorily
transferred to municipal  governments. Enterprise housing and, to a lesser extent child care facilities,
should  primarily  be a subject  of such  divestiture. This would have  a positive influence  on both enterprise
restructuring  and public sector and housing reforms in Russia.  Housing  divestiture  is considered  as a
transitional  strategy  that helps to accelerate  the next step of transformations when  the housing  ownership,
financing, and management  will be transferred to a large extent to the private sector.
The paper also summarizes  the current process of housing  divestiture  as conducted  by Russian
municipal governments. The existing "rules of the game" are highly non-transparent,  and the whole
procedure is largely determined by interests and relative influence  of the players involved. Federal
regulations  are widely violated  and only partially enforced. As a result, all  major determinants  of the
speed of divestiture  appeared  to be under the control of local authorities;  they have influenced  to a great
extent both legal and financial framework for this process, and have a number of opportunities for
postponing  or complete  blocking  divestiture.- 29 -
Most of the enterprise managers, on the contrary, are interested  in housing divestiture.  They
expect financial  gains from this process (though cost reduction  will be partly compensated  by increase
in tax payments)  as well as radical  decrease  of administrative  burden. Half of them admitted  that housing
divestiture would allow them to decrease prices for their products and correspondingly  increase their
competitiveness.
The paper provides quantitative  estimates  of the fiscal  price of divestiture.  The government  will
be required to spend up to 1.2-1.6% of GDP annually to support divested assets.  To arrive to these
estimate,  we provide  quantitative  estimates  of the overall social spending  of Russian  enterprises  in 1992-
94, as of 3-4  % GDP a year, and evaluate  the potential  share of these costs, which will have  to be covered
by the consolidated  budget after divestiture. It appears  that the total enterprise  social spending  in Russia
remains  at its very high pre-reform  level of 20% as a share of the gross wage costs. This makes  the path
of restructuring  the Russian  enterprise sector quite different from that of Eastern Europe.
While the overall fiscal price for divestiture  is not too high, an efficient  government  support of
divestiture  will  require an accurate  evaluation  of intra-regional  differences  with regard to the tax base
and share of enterprise assets. Up to now, the Ministry of Finance does not have the capacity  to make
such an assessment.  To make the process of divestiture  sustainable  in the medium and long-term, the
Government  must clarify corresponding  regulations, encourage  local administrations  to increase cost
recovery  in housing, and to develop  various alternative  reforms for the housing sector  which will foster
a reduction in its excessive  maintenance  costs.  If macro stabilization  in Russia proceeds  further, the
government  must be prepared to face much quicker reduction in enterprises' spending on maintaining
their social assets.- 30 -
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ANNEX 1.  CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SAMPLE IN THE ENTERPRISE SURVEY
A special survey of 24 Russian manufacturing  enterprises from ten different cities was conducted in
December of 1994 by VTSIOM as a part of the preparation  of the World Bank's Enterprise Housing
Divestiture  Project.
Location:
single enterprise  or single sector cities:
Novodvinsk  - I
Dzerzhinsk  - 2
cities dominated  by several large enterprises:
Engels  - 2
Novocherkassk  - 3
Orenburg - 2
Komsomolsk-na-Amure  - 3
rmedium-sized  cities with diversified  econromy:
Smolensk  - 3
Kursk - 3
large cities with diversified  economy:
Volgograd  - 2
Krasnoyarsk  - 3.
Legal form:
- joint stock company  with controlling  interest in state hands  - 3
- joint stock company  with less than 50% of shares in state hands - 9
- totally private joint stock company  - 11
- state enterprise - 1
Relation  to privatization  process:
- in the process of privatization  - 5
- privatization  process completed  - 18
- privatization  is forbidden  - I
Stage  of enterprise housing  divestiture:
- divestiture  completed  before 1990  - I
- in the process of divestiture  - 11
- interested  in divestiture,  but negotiations  have not started yet - 10
- not interested  in divestiture  - 2- 33 -
Financial  and economic  characteristics.  While the  enterprises  in the  sample  varied  substantially  as to their
sizes as well and magnitude  of their housing  burden, most were the large and extra-large  firms (average
employment  for the sample was above 4300 in 1994), as from one to three largest corporatized  firms
were selected  in each city. Most firms experienced  substantial  financial  problems. During 1992-93  their
average reduction in employment  amounted  to 25% of the labor force'.  In the middle of 1994, about
13% of their labor  was permanently  on unpaid  leave. As a result  of these problems.  some 17  of 24 firms
said they had reduced delivery of social services recently; while only 7 firms had not decreased the
volume of provided  social services.
Social and housing spending.  At the same time, the firms were not able to reduce their spending on
housing. Real spending on housing in 1994  remained  at its 1993  level, while  both cash wages and non-
housing  social spending  declined  in real terms. Tenants  have  paid as much as doubly-higher  share of total
housing costs in 1994 than in 1993. On average, each enterprise in the sample was responsible for
maintaining  more than 80 multi-apartment  buildings  with as many as 5000 apartments  in them.
Total housing  costs, denominated  in per employee  terms, amounted  to 20% of the average cash
wages 2, while the full housing and social costs made 35% of the average wage 3. This provides a useful
indicator  of the scale of wage distortions  which will be eliminated  as a result of divestiture. Since  total
payroll costs for Russian  industry are almost equal  to the value of the gross profit, this data may also be
considered  as a measure  of a potential  gross financial  benefits  for enterprises  participating  in divestiture,
without  accounting  for an offsetting  tax effect.
It is interesting  to note that 20 out of 24 enterprises  have an accumulated  stock of non-finished
housing and they expressed  the wish to complete  construction  of these sites if they could get sufficient
funds. Enterprises  reported  that more than a half of their remaining  employees  were registered  to receive
a new apartment.
l  All averages  presented  in this section  are  non-weighted.
2  Expenditures  on heat  and  hot water  constituted  about  a half  of the total  housing  costs.
3  Comparison  of these  results  with  the data  from  Table  2 proves  that  the social  burden  is rather  unevenly
distributed  across  enterprises.  While  for the  industrial  sector  as a whole,  average  social  costs  amount  to a quarter
of both  payroll  and  gross  profit,  for the  largest  providers  this level  is about  35  %, which  means  that  for many  small
and  medium-size  enterprises  this amounts  to only 10-15%.- 34 -
ANNEX 2.  MAJOR  REGULATIONS  GOVERNING  ENTERPRISE  HOUSING
DIVESTITURE
RF Law  On Fundamentals  of the Tax System, December  27, 1991 (amended  by Law On Introducing
Changes and Amendments  to Certain Russian Federation  Tax Laws, December  22, 1992).
RF Law On General Principles  of Local Self-Governance  in the Russian Federation, August  28, 1995
RF Presidential  Decree  No. 721 On Organization  Measures  of Transformation  of State-Owned  Enterprises
into Joint-Stock  Companies,  July 1, 1992.
RF Presidential  Decree  No. 8  On Use of Socio-Cultural  and Communal-and-Personal  Service  Facilities
of Privatized  Enterprises,  January 10, 1993.
RF Presidential  Decree No. 2265  On Guaranties  of Local Self-Governance  in the Russian Federation,
December  22, 1993.
RF Presidential  Instruction  No. 114-RP On Approval  of the Status of By-Site  Composition  of Federal,
State and Municipal  Ownership  and on Procedure  of Ownership  Rights Registration. March, 18, 1992.
RF Supreme  Soviet  Decree No. 3020-1. On Delimitation  of State Property in the Russian Federation.
December  29, 1991. (with editorial changes  of May 23, 1992  and July 21, 1993).
RF Government  Decree  No. 86  On Procedure  of Kolkhozes  and Sovkhozes  Reorganization,  December
29, 1991.
RF Government  Decree No. 708  On Privatization  and Reorganization  Procedure  of Enterprises in the
Agro-Industrial  Complex, September  4, 1992.
RF Government  Decree  No. 1325 On Financing  of Socio-Cultural  and Conmnunal-and-Personal  Services
Being Transferred into the Authority of Local Bodies of Executive Power during Privatization of
Enterprises, December  23, 1993.
RF Government  Decree No. 235  On the Order of Transferring  of Socio-Cultural  and Communal-and-
Personal Services in the Federal Property into State Property of Subjects of Russian Federation and
Municipal  Property. March 7, 1995.
GKI Order No. 135-r On Streamlining  of the Process of Differentiation  of Ownership  Rights to Socio-
Cultural and Communal-and-Everyday  Services  of Privatized  Enterprises,  January 27, 1993.
GKI Letter  No. 13/648 On Procedure  of Transferring  Enterprise  Housing  Stock, Housing  Maintenance
and Housing  Repair Units Servicing  This Stock into Municipal  Ownership,  January 24, 1995.- 35 -
ANNEX 3.  SOCIAL ASSETS IN COAL INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE
COAL
The coal sector has the largest single subsidy item remaining  in the federal budget. The sector
received  about 1.2% of GDP in subsidies  in 1994  and, as estimated,  about  0.6% of GDP in 1995.4 Due
to its privileged  status under socialism, coal mines have accumulated a large number of social assets,
which  are currently a subject  to the direct government  financing  together  with covering  operational  losses
of coal extraction. By our estimates,  at least 125,000 employees,  or 15% of the total, of the state coal
company  Rosugol, are engaged in providing social services.  Budget  subsidies  to support social assets
amount to 17% of the total budget funding, i.e. 0.19% of GDP in 1994.  This social spending per
Rosugol employee  accounts for about 28% of their average wage bill.  The Russian Government  has
developed  a number of recommendations  to re-channel  the social subsidies  from the mine associations
to municipal governments  in coal regions (Coopers & Lybrand, 1995).  So far there has been little
progress with their implementation  so far.
AGRICULTURE
Agriculture is another sector of the Russian economy, in which firms are heavily involved in
providing  social services  to both employees  and local population  and government  finances  their delivery
through  implicit  and explicit  subsidies.  According  to Goskomstat,  agricultural  farms spent  0.25 % of GDP
on social services  in 1993-94,  which is about 8% of entire enterprise  social spending. At the same  time,
explicit government  transfers to agriculture  (not including  tax exemptions),  comprised  2.4% of GDP in
1994',  and are about 10 times higher than direct social spending  by farms.  In fact, social services in
agriculture are heavily subsidized  by the government in an indirect way via subsidies to main farm
products. This distorts incentives  of all parties involved  and make the financial  environment  within the
sector non-transparent.
While potential fiscal impact of divestiture in rural areas is quite small 6, there are a number of
institutional  and  legal peculiarities  of the status of social assets managed  by agricultural farms versus
those controlled  by urban industrial enterprises, which complicate  divestiture  of these assets to local
governments. As a result, divestiture  in rural areas is progressing even slower than in the cities. This
leads to two different kinds of problems.  First, under the current financial crisis in agriculture, the
quality of traditionally  provided services  has substantially  deteriorated. In contrast to the cities, much
of the rural population  does not have access  to alternative  sources  of supply of these services, especially
in education  and health.  Second, the delivery of such important services  via farms creates additional
barriers for farm restructuring  because of the disincentives  for workers to leave the farms and because
4  As reported  by the Ministry  of Economy.
5  Figures  are  estimates  on the  basis  of MoF  and  CBR  data. This  includes  1  % of directed  subsidized  credits
from  both  CBR  and  the  consolidated  budget  and 1.4%  of GDP  of explicit  budget  (both  federal  and  local)  subsidies.
Less  than 10%  of these  subsidies  are explicitly  targeted  at supporting  delivery  of social  services.
6  Rural  social  assets  are relatively  cheaper  because  housing  makes  a smaller  share of these  assets. In
addition,  rural  housing  has much  lower  access  to utilities,  and, therefore  requires  less subsidies.- 36 -
closing loss-making  farms is difficult  when there is no alternative  institutional  framework  for delivering
social services.
Institutional  features include:
(i)  A tax regime under which farms are totally  exempt from paying some basic taxes such as profit
tax and turnover  tax and local authorities  have no power to reduce  these exemptions  as social assets are
divested. The local govermnents  therefore lack a solid tax base to finance  divested  social services,  and,
compared with cities, rural local authorities  have even less incentives  to accept  the asset transfer.
(ii)  The institutional  weakness  of local authorities  in rural areas at the village  level. Traditionally  in
Russia, local administrations  in such places perform  only very simple administrative  functions, such as
registration of  what,  and are not  capable of managing delivery of  social and  housing services.
Construction,  capital  repair, heat  and other utility  supply,  etc. have  been  delegated  to specialized  divisions
of large agricultural  farms, and were not incorporated  into the municipal  government  structure. Human
capital  is also inadequate  for regulating  utility enterprises  in the case of the transfer of existing  facilities
into independent  utility firms for servicing  local social assets.
(iii)  Less scope for competition  within the housing  sector in rural areas, at least in the medium  term.
It is likely that large former state farms will still dominate  at the local level and will retain control over
maintenance  services. The combination  of non-competitive  supply of services and weak governance
capability  of local authorities  complicates  asset,  and especially  housing, divestiture.
Legal  features include:
(i)  Employees'  rights. According  to existing  regulations,  social assets  managed  by state or former state
enterprises are subject  to divestiture. However, about a half of all agricultural  farms in Russia before
1992  had a legal status of kolkhozes  (i.e.- they were collectively  but not state owned). This means that
legally  the GOR cannot require the full divestiture  of social assets from kolkhozes  in the way that it can
from former state enterprises, including  former state owned  farms. Instead, GOR's strategy is based on
imposing  restrictions for full privatization  of the social assets and encouraging  kolkhozes  and former
kolkhozes  to divest them.  In general, existing regulations  regarding farms require social assets to be
excluded from those farm assets that are subject of distribution on individual shares among farm
members. These social assets might be, but are not required to be, transferred to municipal  ownership
or become a part of a  non-distributable  fund of the farm under restructuring.  Housing might be
transferred  or sold to tenants.'
(ii)  Regional  vs. federal ownership  rights. The federal  program  of social  asset divestiture  is focused
on assets maintained by federally owned enterprises, which are, as a rule, medium- and large-size
industrial  enterprises  located  in urban areas. With a few exceptions,  enterprises  in the agriculture  sector
are not. and have not been, federally owned assets.  This means that the GOR has not committed  to
provide funds to compensate  regional budgets for additional  costs related to divestiture of rural social
assets.  As a result, the federal government is not in a position to impose strong pressure on local
authorities  to accelerate  rural divestiture,  and local administrations  have strong fiscal disincentives  to do
so.
7  Government  Resolutions  No. 86 of 12/29/91  and No.708  of 9/4/92.- 37 -
ANNEX 4.  SOCIAL  ASSETS  OF VLADIMIR  TRACTOR  PLANT
As many large Russian  enterprises, the Vladimir tractor plant used to provide a wide range of
social services  before 1992. Between  1992  and 1994, the enterprise  faced a severe  demand  shock for its
tractors, which brought about a substantial  reduction  in both employment  and spending  on maintenance
of social assets. However, only a minor portion  of these  assets (some  kindergartens  and sport facilities)
was formally divested  to the city in this period.  In 1994,  the enterprise still had to cover losses related
to the maintenance  of these assets which cost the equivalent  of more than 40% of gross profit. It should
be mentioned  that all social facilities listed below in Table 1, except housing stock, kindergartens,  and
educational  facilities, have  been included  into the founding  capital of the enterprise and privatized  along
with the productive assets.  The management  of the firm was not supposed to divest such assets as
dormitories, sport, entertainment, recreational, and medical facilities, while their maintenance  costs
amounted  to almost a quarter of the entire spending  on social assets.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the potential financial gain for the plant, which might be
associated with the full divestiture of social assets non-included in its founding capital.  All other
conditions  with respect to financial  flows and taxation rules are considered intact. The analysis  shows
that under the present regime, the plant enjoys substantial  profit tax benefits, which offset 30% of the
actual  social spending. However, even when these exemptions  are accounted  for, the net financial  gain
for the plant from full divestiture  of housing and remaining  kindergartens  still would be quite large, up
to a half of the actual spending  on maintenance  of the whole stock of social assets or more than 20% of
the gross profit.-38  -
Table  4.1.  Spending  on maintenance  of  social  assets  by  Vladimir
Tractor  plant  in 1994,  mn  rbl.
Housing
4082
o/w: Dormitories,  1/  850
Child care
1315
Sport facilities  108
Recreation facilities  160
entertainment facilities  118
Medical unit  87
Education
41
TOTAL  Spending  5911
o/w: on assets subject to divestiture  4588
-"-,  as  % of the total  - 77.62
Spending credited against tax payments  5188
-"-,  as % of the total spending  87.77
TOTAL Spending, as  % gross profit  42.38
Memo:
Gross Profit  13948
Total Sales  834900
I/  - estimate
Table  4.2.  Potential  financial  impact  of divestiture.
Before divestiture  After divestiture
Actual  Estimate
Spending on maintenance of social assets  5911  1323
o/w:  Spending  credited  against  tax  payments  5188  1000
Turnover  tax  payments  0  252
Profit  tax  exemptions  (-)  1815.8  438.2
Net  costs  4095.2  1136.8
Net  costs  as  %  of  profit  29.36  8.15
Net  gain  from  divestiture  2958.4
Net  gain  as  % of  the  initial  costs  50.05Policy Research Working Paper Series
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